































MANAGERIAL SHARE OWNERSHIP AND DISCRETIONARY 
ACCRUALS IN AUSTRALIA: DO INDEPENDENT AND 
EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS HAVE DIFFERENT INCENTIVES? 
Arijin· Khan•, Po.ul Mather** 
Abstract 
We examine the relation between managerial share ownership (MSO) and discretionary accruals in 
Australi3. We find a positive relation between MSO and discretionary accruals up to a certain level of 
MSO follo"·ed by a negative relation (inverse !)-shaped). We suggest that these unique results are a 
result of certain Australian institutional features that are markedly different to those in the US and the 
UK and imply that the mmership-discretionary accruals relation is context specific with the wider 
corporate governance systems influencing the theorised incentive effects. We also posit that executive 
directors and independent directors have different ownership-discretionary accruals incentives and 
report results consistent \.\ith this proposition. 
Keywords: Managerial Share O>mership, Discretionary Accruals, Incentive Alignment, 
Entrenchment 
JEL classification: G32, G34. M41 





It is <.1rg.u~d that incrensc:d tc\·ds of manag~rial 
shart:: O\"-'nership (hel'~inafl:t:1· MSO) in a firm h~lps 
to align th-.c interests of owners and man~gt:rs, 
th~ri:!fort!, mitigating agcmcy problems (fonsen and 
Meckling 1976}. Arguing that such in~~ntive 
alignnid:.nt has 1..-onlracting tmplications. Warfic.::ld. 
Wild and Wild ( 1~95). pos;t that corporate 
sti!kt:holtkrs impose mort: rr;:stric!iv~ i;ontractua! 
constraints denominated in accounting nwnbers as 
MSO and therefore. incentive alignment, declines. 
The pres~n'-=~ of ac~ounting based constraints in 
tum provides m~n:ig.:rs with incentivl!S to use 
accounting discr<:!tion to hdp alleviate: these 
constraints. An a!t~n1ative theort!tk:al argumr.mt not 
consid<rcd by Warfield et al. ( 1995), is that hlgh 
MSO may result in managerial entrenchment 
{Dcmsetz. 1983: Forno nnd Jonsen, 1983). The 
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tht::m to si.:cure their position in ~he firm th.creby 
insulating them from cc:nain disci.pli.oing 
me.;hanisms which in turn <:r~tes agi::ncy problems. 
The p<JU:ntial for <ntrem:hment as MSO incn:ascs 
may a1so hav~ contracting implications. 
Accordingly. this iniper t<Xploros the relation 
between MSO and discretionary at."Cruals in 
Australia during tile period 2000-2006. 
Extant rt::Search sugg.t:sts that managers have 
incc:ntiv~ to manag~ ~arnings to avoid n::rorting. 
t!arnings <lt:creases an<l losses since various 
contracts a.re:: bn~d on <lCcountin,g numbc::n; (see for 
example, Healy 3nd Wahlen, 1999 for a sum:y of 
1his literaturo). Warfidd or al. ( 1995) posit and find 
that MSO in lho VS and lh< magnitude of 
dis\!retion:ary accruals are inv'trsl!ly n:iated. They 
attribute this to a pasitd inv~l"Se rdationshi.p 
between MSO :lmi a~c.:ounting b::isc:d contracru.::il 
i:onstraints. Simi!ar1). Y r:.o. T~m. Ho an<l Chen 
(2002) find that at low .lc:vds of MSO. the l<:Vel of 
incom!! inc~ing dtscrt!tionary accruals has a 
negative relation with MSO in Singapore:. 
However, al higher lovels of MSC the relation 
reve"5es sug~esting. that stakeholders contracting 
with finns recognise th• potential for managetial 
entrenchment and contract accordingly. ln a related 
study, Gabriolsen. Gramlich and Plenborg (2002) 
fa.it lo find any statis.ticaHy signifh .• -ani. rclation 
~l"\Yeen MSO and discrt!tionary :.tct,;ruals ln Danish 
firms. ln short,. tht!n:: is no consisttenl evldl$ncc on 
the relation betwet!n MSO and ~amings 
mantigemt::nt m~asurc.d by di.,;.cr~Llon~ry ac~ru:Jls. 
Several factors motivart! this study. first. it is 
argu~d that t't!aturc::s of the Austrati.in legal systtmi, 
market for corporate control. ownership 
characteristks and other corporate governance 
featurt!S mt!:ans that th<; Australian ~rporatt.: 
govc.!rnancc syS[t:m is markedly differt;nt from that 
of the US and the UK. For example. Australian 
t.'Ompanies h01v~ high k:vds of ownership 
concen1rn1ion with La Porta. Lopa-de·Silanes, 
Shleifor and Vishny (!99'1-) reporting that 45% ofa 
sample of the larg.ost AustratW.n companies had a 
shareholder holding more than I 0% 01· lhe equi1y 
whilst only JU% of the largest companies in the UK 
and 20% of !he largest US companies had a 
sharehoider owning more than [ 0% of the equity. 
Moreover. Australian block holdcrS are n!lativ1dy 
passive in monltoring of manageme!lt {Dig.r:mm and 
Galanis. 2004}. The market for corporate oontrol is 
an important mechanism to discipline:: ma.n:-igern~nt 
bu\ the Australian market for corporat~ control is 
h~ss activ~ than thos~ in the; US and UK.1 
Ad<litiona!ly, the proxy voting by the shareholders 
in Australian cornpanit:S is lower than thi:: US and 
the UK companies (81:\hel and Gillan, 2002).2 In 
view of the above. it is suggested that Auslralian 
shareholders do nQt mc:ed a particularly large 
shar~holdi:ng to maintain "practical control'' 
(Lamba and Stapkdon. 200!j. 'l'heso institutional 
ditT~!'l!nc~ may h~vc an c:ff~t on th~ rcfa.tion 
Detw~c:m MSO and discretionarv accruals. for 
~mpk. managerial ~ntrc:nchm~t effects 
associated with "practical control~ may lake plaC1! 
at lower fevds of ownc:rship. [n spite of the 
differen<>es, there is no re.:ent study that di=ly 
examines che relation betwec:n MSO and 
discretionan· acauals in Australia.3 
Second: prior resetirch that suggosts manag.:rial 
incenth1 i::s to munag~ earnings docs not dlstici.gu:sh 
b!!tWtX!l th<: inccntivJ...-s of c-xec:utivc and r.on· 
-t:X<cutive din:ctors. in pattl~u!ar th~ indc:penden.t 
directors. We. argu" that cxecutiY~ and ind~d(!r.t 
dir<:"¢tors havi:: difterent im:entives that are likely to 
in.flucencl! thdr behaviours. For exa.mpl.e# th.: 
oxecutivo directors are rosponsible fo( the day to 
day operation of the busit?~ss atid it is Ukdy that 
their r~putaijpn in the mamigcri3! Jabour m::u1::~t is 
mo.re: c[osdy tkd to t~ firm's profitability and 
value maxlmising activities. On ~hi! oth~r hand. 
there are economi.e incentives for \ndept:ndent 
directorS to focus on their monitoring role rn order 
to t-nhance the valut!' uf their human t.-apita! in tht: 
managerial labour market (Fama and Jen.sen, !983). 
· It is likely that these r<putation effects wi!l 
overshadow any incentive alignment or 
entrenchment effects that may odlerwise !!rise as a 
t"t!Sult of thdr owning shares to the finn.~ 
Third, it is possible dlat the levds ofMSO rnay 
be endogenously determined as part of the finn"s 
broad~r operating and financing a.rrangi:mt!nts 
{Oemsctz.. t9S3).r Accordingly, firms whh larger 
ao<lJor kss. :e!i~blt! o;;-i.:rua!s f1n&or gr~t~r i..-ai.""nin~ 
volatflily may choose gov~man1.;e stru::.t1.m!.S, S'..1'.:.h 
2s higher kvttls of !vtSO to reduce agency cos:.s. 
The in~onsist<:nt results n:port~d by prior studies 
may ~ lhi:: result of thdr failure:: to ad.dress th~ 
possibility 1ha1 MSO ;s endogenously determined. 
Our prineipat tests shows a nor.linear (inve-rs~ 
U-shu~) refation betv...~n managerial ownership 
and the absolute value of discretionary accruals. 
Spt!citk:aUy ~ we find a positive :-dation betwei..-n 
MSO and discretionary accru;;i.Js up to a L~rtain 
point followed by a negatiw relation. Our analyses 
(eveal a similar rdation betw"';ln ownership and the 
va.lut of discretionary accruals for exl!'Cutivt! 
dlrectocs as for managerial ~woorshi? -as a \vhole. 
Wu also find that tht:Se rl!Sults are <l.rivcn bv firms 
with inoomi:: increastn~ as oppoS¢.i t<l income 
~cr~ing. discrt:tionary at.'Cru::ds. Hov.-::vt:r. we 
find no signifo ..• -ant relation bt:twce:n .share 
ownership by tlli: indi::ptnd~nt dirf!Ctors and the 
valui: of discl"t!tionary accruals. Our r-r:s.ults are 
robust to the alt~rnativc:. <!Stimat<;:S of discn!tiona.')' 
accruals. potential slzt:!! i;:ffccts. as w-i;!I as concern 
for autooorrelntiony hcit:rosked.asticity and 
multicollinearity. Thus, in conirast to the US and 
Singapore: Wt find a positiv¢ relatlon benveen 
MSO and discrt:tionary accruals at lower levels of 
owm:rship \ .. ·hich is OO}isist~M with ~ntrc::ncim1er.ts 
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effects commem:ing. at lower !~vc::ls of MSO. Afi~r 
:J cl.!rcain h;vd of ~lwn.crship !s :trn.1ini!d, w<: St:it! :J 
ni:gati vie rt:'lation consistic:nt with reduci::d 
d\s1..'Tctionary accrual adjustm~ts assodated \\'ith 
th.e lncentive alignment. 
\Ve cvntribule IO !he Jiterotllte in a pu,mb~r of 
ways. First w~ r~port uniqut: ~suits w~.h.::h \Ve 
argue: is consistent with the wider AU.slralian 
t:<:irporatc gov~rnanc.: setting ~hat may aUo\•.-
man:igers co m:iint:iin ·•practical cor1tror~ und g.uin 
privat<: bend1is at l-C::,ativd~· low lc:vels . of 
uwni:rship which is reflected in contracting 
behaviour. Thi!' fact thar th-t: rt:Sults arc: drivt!n by 
firms '"''i!h incomi: jncrcasing discretionary accruals 
is consistent with the: posited \:Ont.meting 
bchavioW's. Otu- results rerrulin consist~nt 3fter 
addressing the! possibHity that MSO is 
endog.~nously Lhmmnin~. Sc:.;;und, whilst prior 
work fo.;usi:s on MSD as a whok'. w~ ~rgut: thjl 
cxc:cutiv~ and independenc dir~r...'tors havt: diffaent 
incentives. Th<: r~sulfs from examining the relation 
bet,iw·~n exei.."Uti\·e. dirt:i.=tol' share: ownership 
(hereinattor ESO) as well as independent director 
share ownership (hereinafter !SO) and discretion:iry 
;.>t.'Cfua~s supports such difforential incentives. 
The papt!'r is slrnc.:lt.m.:::d as follows: ~ction 2 
provides th..: thcori::tkal !:rnckg.:-ound. S"tion 3 
describe:s. the: r~~-3.rch design. while se-Cticm 4 
~ports the main results. s~ct!on 5 summarises and 
d.ra\.\'S i.:ooclusions. 
2. Theoretical background 
MSO ri..osults in a manager who owns a. frnction of a 
tirm's share dirr:ctly ;issuming tht: consc:quence:s of 
thclr actions thus alig.ning th1;:i( inCc::ntlvd With 
. other shareholders (fons.:n and Mepkling. 1976). 
Hen;;i;:, mano.gtrs owain.g shaNs in a firm an: likdy 
to strh:c: to make bette-r lm•estmertt decisions and 
ma:dmise volue. It is also less lik~ly Lhat the 
manug~rs v.·il! engagt: in opportul'listic- bt:havioLtr 
he.<'ICt:-. as tv1SO increases. thl!' d~rnand for 
· ::n:counting bastd contr:i~luai ~un:i:tr~ints wt!! 
decline twartie1d et at .• 1995>. t-1owever, arier 
$Om~ poim. high kvets of MSO can result in 
manag..:rs bi:t.:oming entrem.:hed (Ot::msetz. 198'3).u. 
rhc arg\.lrn(nl is that th~ extra voting power h-t::lps 
s~.,,;ure thdr positions in ihe firm thereby protecting: 
.thi::m fr{Jm c~nain discipH:n:ng mech:i.nisms (for 
•.-ample. the m:inag<rial labour morket and rhe 
mark~t for corporate: conu-ol) which may have- an 
adv.:rsc:: c:ffect on th~ir behaviour. Hc:nc~ th~ initial 
tht!O!)' large:!) developed in th\.: owrtcrShip~ 
performance lit..:ratur~ would suggi:::st a n<:gative 
relation bc::twe~n MSO and discnttionary acctuals 
consistent with incentive ~lignmcnt up to some: 
turning. point followed by Cl positive relation when 
th~ C!JS.ts a~ocimt::d with entrt!nc.;hment ~XCt:~d tht:: 
inct:nti,·t: b(!rt~fits of manage:ria\ ownc:rship (site for 
e>.amp!c:. Morl'k, Shldfor ~nd \'ishny. 19,8~: 
McConndl and S<rvao$ 1990), ·ll is ~lso !)-Ossible 
ch~< th< proviously discussed. wid<r corporate 
governance syst!!m mayi have. an t:ffo:ct on the 
rdation b<tWe"'1 'MSO an\f d.iscretjonary accruals. 
For example~ manag~ial c:otrenchmtffi.t effects 
associated with ··praciical contr9l"'. may take place 
at lowc:r l!!vds of owner$h1p·iri. Austr.alia. 
Warfiol<l et al. (l99;) :argue_that there is a 
svstematic n:lation b<:twoon MSO <md tho !evols of 
<lisi.."fetlon:.'l.ry nt:ccuZJ.ls ZJ.nd find an inversi:: relation 
between the levels of MSO ar.ct discretionary 
accruals in the U$. They argue that firms with low 
MSO ore subject to moro accounting bssed 
contractual. constraints as stakeholders percdve a 
lack of incentive alignm<:nt. Thtlse contractual 
ptO\'isions it'l llll'n provid.; inct:ntivt:S for managers 
tv us~ 41ccru2! a<ljustmc:nt.s to circumvl!nt such 
constraints. Whilst, Yeo ot al. (2002) report similar 
results to Warfidd et al. \ 1995) at low levels of 
MSO. they show that at higher levels of MSO tho 
relation revorsos suggesting that stakeholders 
contracting with firms r~cognise the potential for 
ma:nageriaf entrenchment and contract accordingly. 
Theory sugg~sts some combination of 
incentiv~ alignment and entrenchment effects and 
th~rtfor~. a noniim:ar rc:lation betwe:c:n MSO and 
<lis\.-"rdion~ry ::u.:cruals. Prior studit:s that identify an 
i:mtnmcli'ment i::ffoct in th~ owm:rship--performance 
litc..Tatun:tdocument it i;ommc:ncing at varying levels 
- for exampl<, MSO of 5% in the US \Morck et al., 
1988) ~nd 7% in the UK (Da,•ies. Hiller and 
McCJogon, 2005). Yeo et al. (2002) report an 
entrenchment cfft:ct commencing at an MSO of · 
25% when examining th~ ownership-discrdionary 
accruals relation in Singapore. lt was previously 
argued that foatut·os of 1he wider corporate 
governam:t:: syst~m ·may mean that managt:rS may 
achit::\r't: Hpracticat contror· at rdativdy low lr:::vcls 
of MSO in Austtalia. Accordingly. whilst a p!1'Cise 
pattern is hard to pre-diet~ we posit that 
entrenchm~ni ~ffocts arc Hkt::ty to be present at 
!ow~r kvels of the MSO-diS(..Te:tionary a(.."<.."!Uals 
rdation th.:in previously documc:ntt:d, 
Prt!vio~tS rt:s.-=:arch io this ar-e:a do~s not 
differentiate betwt:cn th~ rolr:::s of the managers 
owning sh~res. Wt:: argut: that e~ecutive directors 
and non-executive directors (particularly the 
indep~Ue:nt din:!cturs) are likely to have different 
incentives as will the effoc1 of any shoros they hold. 
Ex~culivc- direclors are mor~ closely involved in the 
opc:rations of the business and it is likely that their 
rc:putational capitni is mor~ closely tied to their 
value maximising activities induding scrateglc as 
w~u as operational decisions. Ht:nc~ it is argued 
that fol' any gi\'c:n !<::v-et of shar~ owner.ship 
cxc:cutivl! directors~ in comparison to independent 
<licectors. are more susct::ptibie to the effects of 
.inct:ntive alignment nn<l entrenchment. 
On tho o1hcr h~nd. it is argued that the 
economics of the managerial labour mark~t 
' ' . l{!Jgjjjj·"'1'!k./'iu::."S ·.·.~ 
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3. Research design 
3.xData 
provid<::S incc:ttti vc::s for th~ (l{}tl-c:xocuti Ve:' dkc:ctors, 
more spe~ifica!!y the independent directors. 10 be 
effi::ctivc: monitors in order to enhance thelr 
reputation and the value of their human ~apita[ 
(Fama and Jonsen. 1983). Similarly. Gilson (1990) 
asserts that. whilst inside direc1ors are also 
managl!rs of the firms. <>utside directors hav~ no 
continuing prof~iona! rclalion with tht:: firm other 
than as diri:ctors and ar< responsibk for monitoring. 
the managc:ment. Future dirt:ctorships mo.y bt: a. 
function of thr; reputation th~y d~'·dop :as ieffet;tive 
monitors. ln case of ind~pc:ndent Jireclors, concern 
for the!ir reputation as effective monitors is likdy to 
ourwdgh any issues relating. to inc~ntivc alignment 
or cmrenchme!nt that may othcr..\'ise arisr;: as a n::su!t 
of owning shares in the firm. Acc.ordiog.ly we 
expect thtt rl:!lation between ext!cutive directors ::i:nd 
disl!rl!tfonary accruals to be: as p0site<l in the: cas~ of 
MSO as a whole but wo expect no relation between 
fodep1:ndc:nt diret."tOI share:: ownership and 
dlsi.::retiona:ry accruals.7 
We idontified tho top 300 Austr:llian comp:anies by 
markcl capitalisation 31 two dotes, 30 June 1999 
and 30 June: ~006. Consfsttm! wjth the prior 
lit~rature~ we ~xcludc: banks. financial ittStitut?ons, 
trusts 3nd utility firms ( 49 firms) which have 
diffi:n:nt disclosure requin:mc::nts and/or ditforent 
corporate govemanc~ sfructun:s- We exclude 
another 63 firms due to missing information. The 
final sampk: comprisc:s of1hc: remaining firms wilh 
a total of 1173 t'irm-yi;:ar observations OVdr lhe 
sevc:n yt:ar period.8 As evident in Table [, the 
sample firms belong to 21 Globa! Industrial 
Classification Standard Sectors lGlCS) fodustry 
Groups. We coll~ the required accounting 
information from Asp.;:ct F'in Analysis and Connect 
4 d~tahases. The ownorship aod otiior corporate 
governance data was hand collected from the 
corporate gov~rna.nce djsclosures, share.holding 
information and din~ctors" report containOO i.n 
annual reports.9 
Table 1. Sample Description 
P;lnd A: Sa.nek sclt:\:1ion 
Numl>c:t orGrms: 300 
t .... 
Fi1UU1~1:zl ai\dwt1lit>·~~1~ .;;9 
Com~ules withGU1 m:ces=y mfor1nali\'ti fO' 
«irpQQfc go~cmance :wd: cerutc1 v:Ul:lbk OOt::i. 6; 
Tqr.a!. --;gs 










Conu~"'=1 service&:. wpphes 
Trai~pu·~i<x1 
H..:ruth \'.4\l't equipment & suJ))>f1cs 
Ht;iWt c:ito pro111<1i::ts & $Cf'\llCC:S 























Pr~ious ~~S'-=3.rch has ust:d Liiffol'~11t tests to 
me<:surt:. discn::tlunary accruals including changc:s in 
t!~rnings, discrl!tionary accl'unls. accounting poii-cy 
changes .(S~t! for ex~mple, De-chow. Sloan and 
S-iJ..li::eney. \995). w~ ust:- a parsimo1f1ous modd 
used by Chan. Chan. Jegadet0sh and Lakonishok 
(2006} to t!Stimatt: discretiooar)' accruals.1-0 The 
model is: 
L:,/ACC,,_, "' l E,(TACC,,) , vaes,, (!) 2:,., Sale~,,_, 
Wher~: 
E,{TACC,, )= Exp0<-"ted total aocrna\s of firm i in year\: TACC,,_, =Total accruals" of firm\ in year t-
k: Soles,,_.t =Sates rc ... c_nu<.! vf fo·m i m) car t-k. 
Discrctiofl:ary ~ccruai'iSihen givt!'it by 
DACC,, ~TACC,, -E,(TACC,,) l2J 
WherG: 
DA.CCJ, ;;; Di.scrntionary accruals of firm j in ye:u t ;TACCr1 = Teto.I accruals of firm i in year ti 
E,(TACC,, )~ Expede<l total aocrua\,;ol"firm i in year\ 
Th~ i~\·d of tOl<.l! ac...:ruals has been rdati::d to 
t:l.:itrt::nt sak.s. To smooth any kind uf transitol) 
flut:luations the: propo~i<.in as th...: r~t:o of n moving 
averagl! o( past fi\'e years total accruals to a movir.g 
av~rage of saics has bt:<!n t!Sti.m.ate<l. The 
discretiona1y compon~t is estimat~d by taking the-
diffi:rt:rice between actual and <::stimatl!d total 
accruals as i;akulat~d in c.11uation (2). 
3.3 Model Specification 
We pr~dict a noolini.:ar rdation bdw~en manageria1 
ovmt!1·ship and disc1't!tionary accrua!.s. Accordingly, 
we us~ ~1uadratk specifications for all the 
managerial ownt:rship variabh."S - MSO~ ESO and 
!SO. 
We, :JS~ the fo!Jowing equation to examine the 
rt!ation bi;twc:t:n MSO and discretionary accruaJs 
using an OLS regr~ssion tcchnique.u 
DACC= B,+ B,Mso+B, Mso'+ p,usussp+ B, LEv+p,s1No+ P. AUD+ P,MB+ B,LTACc+ 












Absotute valu~ of discretionary accruals 
:vtanagerin! shor~ O\.\'nership 
Unaffiiiatl!d substan~ial shans ownership 
Leverage:: 
Boilrd indcpi.::ndc:rict: 
Auditor dummy variable 
Mark« to book 
Lagged total accruals 
Loss dummy v;;u·iable 
Size: proxied by the book vatu..: of assets 
T;ible 2 summarises the d~finitio.ns of all the v3riablcs emp!oyt!d in this pt!per. 
, . . 
11!JJ:Y~;~ 
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Mana&crial shari:: owm::rship ?c::rcetiwgi: of oRlimuy shjres O'A'nt:l.l by tht: 
direm:irs of the board 
&..~utivc directors' :;hOl.re O'-"lle~l11p Pero=nra&c:: of on:lmary :.h:u:cs owm:d by tllc 
~.xecut.i;.e llirecto~ of the: 00:2!.rti 
ISO lm~c:pe11den1 dire-:tc>rs' s.nace cn..,n.?~h:p f>~rc.•ernagi: -0( o!dmaty sh:m~s owned by 1.he 
im:le:pentl~nt dm:cmrs of the boorr.I 
USUBSP U1litliha1.ed su.bs:tant1al sh:m:: O\o\nc;rs.h1p Pc::n::~:-1l.3ge of o!dma~ s~.a~ ow1;ed by the: 
un.;iffH1al"Cd (c::!l.c~udu1& the dm:c~1Jr:s) Sllbst3nt!al 
ii.harc::ncil\t:rS 
LEV U::\'Cr~ge R;-:uo ot bool\ viilue of <!'Gbt arct.J Oo\lk v'1l:.:e (If 
:c:;t:!!ass~.s 
BIND Eklart.I ~ndepemJe!1ce Thi; m1mber of sndepcmkr.;: ~m~clor::i scakd by 
U'te s~ of the oo.atd 
AUO A1Jd1tor dummy ,:.mo.bl~ A dumm> varrabl~ t if the firm is audctt..-d by a big 
4 nud11-0t and. othe!\-\"Jse O 
MB Mar!-:et to booi.. laUO 
LTACC L'\gged toc.11 accrrn:!!s , 
MJrkd vatue of eqWty <lrvid~ b)' L.'i.<! took vah.'.! 
ofshat-::holders· i:quity 
Prior year total accrn.1!s scaleU by th.~ pcior ,...~~ 
tot31 ass.c:ts 
LOSS Loss \}l'.lmm:ii "anab!c A d..immy va:'!;:ible 1 if lh~ firm has m.>gz.!11t~ 
ta(mngs ;ind. ocherwtse O 
ASST Siz~ 
3,4 Control vmiables 
The diffCrent control varbbks usl!d in this study 
include unaffiliated subswntial sharehol<l;ngs1 
kvt::1'3gt:, board indepr:nden~. big 4 :i.u<litor, mork~t 
to book ratio. lagged total accru:i!s, loss and size of 
the: tirms. W-::. also i...::ontrol for lh~ GICS industdai 
st:ctors and y~ars. 
We include owm:rship by the una1lHiated 
substantial sharehoJders to control · for the 
monitoring effect (Peasn.:::11~ Pope:: an<l Young1 
2005}. Unaffiliated shar~holdings are m~surcd by 
taking th~ p~n:t::ntag~ of shar'-= ownc:rship by the 
unaffiliat~d substantial shar~holdcrs (other ihan 
direct<Jrs). Man-'lgers h::i.ve 1nt:l!nt?vcs w usi: 
accounting discretio!l when tht:; tre .:lose to a <lebt 
covi::nant vioiation ilnd h~verage may captur<.! S\.lt.'h 
incentiv~s {K\dn, 2002). Wt: 11H,.""asurt: k:veragi:: by 
th~ rJ.tio of book value of dt:bt and bl)ok vaiue of 
total assets. Board in<lept!nd~nc~ can have a 
monitoring eff~ct conslrnining d.iscr~tionary 
0:t<:eruals. Wr:. estimate boan.! independence by 
1.3.ldng tht! proportion of ind~pt:-m.Jenl directors on 
th~ board. Prt.:vious r~'l!arch suggcs! that large audit 
firms (big 4) afe <...-onsidered to be morc: t:fft!ctivt: 
monitor~ of flnandal reporting proc~ eompa~ to 
th!! smaller firms (Francis and Krishnan. 1999). 
Th:!refore,. a <lummv variabk is ust:d to control for 
lhc dfoct of audit~r on th~ kvd of discreticnary 
accruals. FoJlowing pr:;:;vious studks w~ t'1kc 
mark~l tQ book ratio as oo.e of cur t."Ontroi vari.a.btc:s 
and ml!asured as mark~t va!t.te of ~quity d!vidc:-d by 
the book value ol' shareholders· equity (Klein. 
2002). Ac.:eruals a:n: mc:an rcrv~tting.~ wilh the 
mitjurity of the mt:an reversion occurring within a 
year (Oechow ot oL, 1995). A high level of lagged 
total 3\.-Crua!s will prob:ibty n.::Jucc! m;:m:lgers' 
N~tur.Jl logo[ be-Ok vah..1.-! of ~ets. 
ability tu manage t:urrl;!nt period reported earnings 
upward and \.'ice v(;!rsa. Ther~forl!, we o;ontto1 for 
. tht:'. total at:cru~ls of thrc pr~vious period (Koh, 
2003 ). Firms with n~gative earnings are ::!SSociat~ 
wtth greati:r <lis.:retionary 3ccruals (Wang, 2006). 
Hence-: WI! use: a dummy variabt~ wh~n a firm has 
ncgativt i:amings in a particular year. F'i11aH,; we. 
follo\'1 pr~Yious studies and control for the siz.e b>' 
taking a rnllutal log of book value of asse.i:s (see for 
<>xample, Kl<in, 2002: Wang, 2C06). 
4.z Descriptive statistics 
P~md A of Table 3 reports the descriptlve st::ltistics. 
it shows chat tht:; av~rag.;: DACC is 0:064. The 
average MSO is 12.55% which ls similar to the: 
avorngc MSO of 12.4% in the US (Cho, !998) '11\G 
13.02% in the UK (Davies et al., 2005). Th.e 
average ESO and !SO are 6.29% and 2.32% 
respectivc;::ly. Th~ tmaffi!lated subst3nti2.f 
shareholdt!rs. on average. hold 37. l5% of tota! 
shar-::s Olltstanding of the sample observations. 
Panel B of Table 3 represents the correfa.tton 
matrix using Pearson corre!ation. DACC is positive 
and signith:ant!)' correlat~d with MSO and ESO. 
ESO is negative and significantly corrdaled with 
ISO and BIND. It suggests :hat high ESO firms arc 
less Iikt:ly lo have hidi::pt:ndcnt board as well as 
high lSO. Finn size: ts negativd)' corrdatc-d with 
MSO and ESO. sugg1::sting that directors· as wt=H as 
aecutivc <litedurs· t:t.1uity imerr:sts decreast: as ?.he 
firm siz~ increases.. The positive corrdati.on. 
bctwe~ firm size::: and leverage suggests that !argl! 
firms hav~ high l~eragoe. The ki.rge:r firms are also 
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corn!!atlon bctwe.:n MSO ::ind lh~ auditor vatfabte in firms audited by non-big 4 firms which is likely 
indk."'Jtcs Lhat ditt:t::tors have grc~kr ~t.JUity .intt:re-sts co ~ drlvcn by firm size. 
Tnbfo 3. Da;criptiv¢ scari$rics 
'fhe following table reports the descriptive statistics. Different notations tiSed ln th< table are delined as follow.s: MSOa 
P'-::rcentage of ordinar: shares .owned by the directors of the bc.til!d; ESO co Per<::entag.e of ordinary shares owned by the 
t:xccutivc: dirt!(;t-OT.S uf 1hc- bo.srd; ISO ~ Percc:nrag~ ot" ordinary shares own~ by tht: ind!!pc:ndent din:ctors of the: board; 
USUBSP::::. r~rcc11tag.t: of ordim:u; shares O\\onc:d h» lhc: ll113ffili:ni:d (~xc!uding the: directors) substantial sha~hold~rs~ B!ND 
= Bo~rd inJcpcndcrtcC" cnfcultttdd as th~ number of im.Jept!11.lent ditl!ctois s~akd by lh!t SiZC" of the board: LEV == U::veragee. 
1:akulat~d a':i t!il! ratio of book valu~ of debt to book vah.ic: of total ass~1s: ASST"" Natura! log. of book valu~ of;assi=ts: MB :t= 
:-Aark~ Lo-book r.itio: 0UD =A dumm) variabl.; J ifth-c: tinn is auditc:d by big 4 auditors: A dummy variable l if the firm has 
m:~li\..: c:aniings; LT A CC= Prtor yi::ar tofa! accruals. 
f':::ti:itlA 
Mt:in. Stdi:v l\fu:jl.:m 
~150{"/.) lZSS~ t842l ~460 0211 t3.i':58 
l::SO(%) 6' 32~ f.~.261 0241 <t02j 3.121 
ISOi"lwJ 23.?t 7305 Q.l!S 0.024 0771 
l:~t'IJSPW~J ~; 1:'$ '.!2 s~s. \463 190:5 $488 
DACC UOO< • 007(> <J.<JJ9 OOJ61 O.Mll 
WNO 
"' 
o.io 0.00 ... 0.7:5 
UP/ 02-11 02.::s 0.234 Oll4'. 0.332 
AS.'tt s.m 0.716 8.78? $221 9.271 
MB 3.:S45 :-441 2:.:52-0 1478: 46'2 
Panel B 
DA.CC AUD ESO LSO L£\' ASb"T t..OSS LTACC MSO USU BS~ BIND Ma 
t>ACC 1.<tt10 
Pva.t\lt 
Ai..ID .oos2 1.0-00 
J"1·::11lt (0079} 
&~O Q 11)"1 .Q. ~is 
""'" Pv..1.fvc ~-OOOD) (0.000} 
lSO ·\1009 .0074 -0052 1000 
Pv;ih1t (0.7b9) [00l4) {0-0"33) 
u:v 0~<) Q()(,j, .otis;; --0014 l.<100 
Pvalur (0.139) (0,0>4) (OIXl>l (-0.6~0) 
A;%7 ·0..'.!0I 0 /S;I -D.183 .oo::z:; 021>.> 
'""' 
l>v:i.11.ic· (0000) {0000) (0000} (044+) cOoOO) 
LO:'iS O.llO O.Otl 0.0!7 ·0.036 .o !04 -0311 1.000 
P. ~-:i.tue (0.00CJ> (IJ'.716l (0.S?6) tlJ.'22-l) {0.-001) {0.000) 
LTACC ·004?: ·O.GS4 oos; 0()46 0."4 ...OOJ'O .o.oi; 1.000 
Pv:.ilui: (-0.IM) (0.06~) {00o3J (0 !21'.>J (1103.:) (0.309) (0.438) 
MSO 0 118 ·Ot3S 0671> o~S1 ·0042 --0 l92 IJ.OS3 0 lllO I 000 
P•~llX' (0000) (0000) (-000-01 {OCOO) H'UG..~> t0000) (000;;) 10.001) 
t.'Slll;JSP ·OUl:? ..l,'l(.lr,I'} oo.n 0003 OIJ<16 
--0013 ...0.0~9 ooso 0026 1000 
l>¥;11ut (0.lS&) {075-l) (\.14~2) (O'J!t>) (0.~IJ {Q.6S:S) {0.0SO) l0G91) {0.J.SI) 
BIN"D .o,os.; <J(J5;> ·OOZI .o.o:;:; .QOfZ ot.•z Q.QJI O.OZ5 .{),(JO'] 0.094 l,/)(l() 
Pv:dui: (-OOOS> (¢.0?6) l0031) l0.2U9J (O~'i9) (0.:!"67} {0.301) (0.410} (0.768) (0.01ll) 
MB OOZ!i -001>8 0 1\6 .OOIS 
"""' 
OO:il:. 
-0.175 0 007 OOjS 
·0-00t 
-o.ois 1000 
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4.2. Managerial share ownership and 
discretionary accruals 
Table 4 presents the estimation of OLS regression 
results. In Panel A we report the "'suits relating to 
MSO and discTetional)' accma/s. Th<: tlr.st model 
(no <.."Qntrol \1ariabtes) shows a positiv~ significant 
coetlici<nt of MSO (0.000) and a negative 
significant coet1icient of MSO' (0.000). In the 
second modd (with contrnl variables) wt: finU 
signitioant? valoes of the cod'tkients MSO (0.007) 
and MSO '(o.010). The signs of MSO ond 
MS0 2 are positive and negative. respectively. In 
oth~r words, Wt:' find a positive rel3ticn between 
MSO and di~c,.lionary ae<:ruals "P to n certain 
point fullow~d by a n.rgative rclation. 1< implies an 
inverse \J..Shap<:d, relation betwoen MSO and the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals. The 
positive n::la.Lion ~tWt;t:n MSO and discrettonat)· 
accruafs suggest that fn Australia an c:ntrr:ncbmc:nt 
effect S¢ts in at lower levels of ownorship. After a 
ct:rtain lev~I of own~I'3hip is attained, we see a 
rt:!ation consistent with ine~tivc alignment. 
Table 4. Relation ~twet'.n MSO and dis1xe:tionary accruals 
Th~ following tabte 1XpOrts th~ reg~i~n resuhs r.:.garding managt:tial ownl!rship and discretionary aCU1.1.;:ils. Diffore."'lt 
nott1.tions ust:<l •n the t::ible <\rt:: ddir:i!i.l '1S fo/!c,, ... vs: OACC ::== Absolut<' \lalue of Lliscre!ion:iry vc..:ruals: DACC ·h":' = Absolut~ 
value: of im:i:.im~ increasing dis~ri:tiooary accruals: DACC _, . ., = Absolut~ valut: Qf income. d«~asing dis~n:!ionary accruals: 
MSO ;::::. P4!n.~11tag\: of ordina;y shar~s ownt:d by the: din:ctors of th.~ board~ USUBSP =. P<:rci:ntagc of ordinary sha.'\!S Q\\'1'1::d. 
by the ~natii!iatcd {e.\'.clud~ng the direaors) substanri11! shareholders; LEV ,.. Leverage. C(l\C\t!atOO as the ratio of book \.a!ut 
of debt lo book value of total assets; SlND = Board independence calculated as the- numbe( of 1ndepcndtnt directors scaled 
by the size of the board; AUD =-dummy variable I if th!! finn is audited by big 4 auditors; MB os Market to book ratio; 
LTACC = Laggod total accruals: LOSS = Loss dummy vari•bl• : ASST= Natural log of book value of assds. Tho report«! 
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\VG cstimak the turning points in the i.m;er.sc:: 
U·shapr;:d rdotio:ns bt:t\Vl!<:n ownership and 
dis~ri:;:tion:a.0· accruals from thi;:, rt!sutts r~porte<l in 
Tabk 4. Figure I pr~s~nts the graph of the 
estimat<d relation. b~t'\'.~~~·#S(), ~<l, the absotute· · 
value of discrc.tionary accruals. The: estimated. 
turning point for MSO and, dis~retionacy accruals is 
43.5%. 
fig~re I. The !'elation between MSO, ESO and discretionary accruals 
















O.l 0.2 Q.3 0.4 
MSO/E>O 
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The fact that the coc.ftki~nts of some:: otht::r 
control variables 2rt:: stat!stica!ly significant 
sugg~rs that discretionary accruats llre also 
intlu.i::nc~ by Other t·acwrs. Sp!!cificaHy. 
Jiscretionacy acctt1als are positively rek1ted to loss 
(l-OSS) and kvorag< (l.EV) and negatively related 
to boilrd indi::~ndc;:nc...: (BIND) a.nu firm size 
(ASST)_ Ail otht!r control variabl~ ;J.r~ 
insignificant. A pusitiv~ signitkant co!!fficient of 
toss (LOSS) is 1.:onsis1ent with th~ findings of Wang 
(2006). t\ posit~ve! significant l!odfict(!nt of 
leverage (LEV) impli<s lhal managers may manag~ 
c::i.rnings ir. highly lt!vt.:red firms tK!dn, 2002). Tht: 
nt!g.ativi;;: significa.nt (,."<Jc;'/°fil:i~rtt (If b<;ar<l 
independence (8!ND) suggests that monitoring 
eff~ct constrains lhc use of discretionary act-rua!s. 
1"ht: sampk tirrn-yt:ars ari;:, also llivid._:d into 
two sub-samples ac-...-ording. to thl! sign of the::. 
discret.1onm)' accruals, nnd fol' each sub-sample: we 
regress tho absolute value of the discretionary 
accn.tals on MSO and control variables. The 
regression results are present<d in Panel B of Table 
4. Obst:rvations. with positiv~ {negative) 
discrttionary accruals are consistent with income· 
iner~asing (in.com~-decreasing) accrual adjustments 
and DACC .,., (DACC -«) indicates the absolute 
v:riue for positiv~ (n~gative) discr~tionary 
ai;..:ruals. L3 For th~ DACC +l"t' regression~ all 
coefficients of lhi.:: MSO variables ar~ statistically 
significant with the expected signs. th.iii is, 
ccnsistt:nt with the: main regression. For the 
DACC _,, r<gression. all toeffidents of the MSO 
variabks have the exJ)<:Cted signs, but. the 
meffo;ients of !he MSO variables are not 
statistically signiticant. Taken togt::thcr, this 
suggests thflt MSO is significantly associated with 
Cotpora~~ Oumt!rtfn'p ~Ci:mcro[/'V'ofum.e. 9, lssw: I, •Fa[(ZOI1 
income-ln~n::asing but not income-dCcteasing 
accrual adju.stmt::n~s. "fh~ <liffercnct: in rd~tions is 
consist~nt with the ~ontractfrtg argum~nt posit.:;d in 
this paper. 
Wit argw;:d thµl <.l.ift'ert:nt groups uf m:mag~rs 
have different incentives and rdatiun OCtween MSO 
arid diSCR!tional)' accruats ma) vnry ~teptoding on 
whedther shares ar-e owned by rht. executive or 
jndcpendent dir~ctors. Ww::, now examine lht: 
.relotions of own~rship by the exee;utiv~ directors 
an.d <liscn:tionary accl1.1als. We. report the rl!sults in 
?nnel A of Table 5. Th~ first model (no control . 
\·ari3bles) shows a positrve. significant c;o~ffident of 
ESO {D.004) and a n~g::ttiv~ significant <.:m:fficient 
of ESO' (0.046). The second modd (with control 
variables) shows significant P values ·of th~ 
coefficients ESO (0.038) and ESQ '(0.072). Tne 
signs of ESO and ESO 1 are posi{iv~ .and ncg:.ui\.•c. 
!"l!Sp~tivdy \Vtlich lmP,lit::s art invt!rst: U~shap<!d 
relation bt:tW~ICn ESO and discrt:tionary accruals, 
The posi~ive {nl!gativi:-) rel::i.rion between E.SO and 
Uisc.retiona0 accmals implies 0;n t:nlrenchmt:nt 
(im:1:mivt:: alignm~n~J effe<:L Once .:igain. our 
~mpiricat findings suggest that .an t:ntrenchm~nt 
¢ff~ct dominates at low-c:;r lttvd of ex~cl.ltiv~ dir"!t..:tor 
own~rship. After a c1trta.in level of own,ershJp is 
attained, wt! see a rdation consistent with incentive 
a!ignment. The significant cocfficitnts of some of 
tht:: t...-ontrol variables suggest that d~scr~tionary 
;iccrua/s are also influcm.:~d by other factors. That 
is, diS<.:n~tion~ry accruals o.re po~itivdy related to ti 
Juss 3.nt.i nt:gatlvdy relC.il!:J tu bv<i1 d indc:pt:nden..::i: 
and firm siz.c. 
Figurii:: ! also prcsc:ms the graph of th~ 
t:Stimakd relation betwe~n ESO and rhc- absolutt:. 
valut:: of r.fo...:r~tionary ~l.!cruais. We i:::~t:mmc tile 
turning. point in the inverse U-shaped rdo.tions 
betw!;!en ESQ and <liscretionary ai.:cruals at 27.1%. 
Orn.:t:: again. the sample firm-yt...""ars art.! also 
divided into two sub-samples ac.cording, to tht: sign 
of the discr~tionarY at:.:rnols and woe rc-rnn our 
a:oal}si.s. W<-· rcpo:t. the rcsul!s in ?und B o!'T:ible 
5. far the DACC +"" regression we find th::.! .aH t.~e 
coc:::ffici~nts of the ESO var?abks arc: statistically 
sign i ti cant with the! i:xpect~d signs. that is, 
eonsistenf with thi:: rt:sulrs for ESO as a whole. 
Ho\.vcver. the cot:ftii:icnts for the: ESQ variablt!'s in 
tho::: DAC<.: ... ,< r~gtt:"SSion are not significant. Thus 
ESO i$ also associ(lted with income·increasfng but 
not incom~eer~ing accruals . 
We previously argued that independ"ot 
directors are less likely to be influenced by the 
effects of inc~ndv~ aUgnment or eatrenchm~nt and 
henci:: wd expcxt no rdation betwun ISO and 
discretionary ::tccruals. We r~p:icat~ for ISO tht! 
analysis condu.:tic=t! for ESO and we r3i[ to find any 
significant rdation betwec:n ISO and d\scr<:ticnary 
accruals. W< also •.1se :::! tin~a:r specifo ... -atio" oflSO 
IO examine the same rdation o.nd fail to fir.d any 
sieniticant result as well. We do not ~buiat~ t~e 
reSults in th~ intcr~st of breviry . 1.:. 
4,3 Endogeneity of MSO 
We argue that the levels of MSO may ~ 
endogenously tlet<rmined as part of the firm's 
broad~r operating and finandog arrangements 
(Demsetz. 1983). Firms with larger a.'\d/or less 
. r~!fabte accruals and/or greater ~ings volatility 
may choo~ governance ttructu~s~ such as higher 
kvels ·of MSO to reduce agen~J' costs To address 
this pol<ntial probl<:tll. '"' use the instrumer.tal-
v:.iriabh:: (!V) proct::dur~ to r~-~stimate equatfor. 3. 
following Hermo.lin and Wdsbach (l99f). we 
create 2 lagged ownership vari.abk (lugged br or.e 
yar} and US1;:: it a::; ::in instrnment for measuring 
MSO. Our n:su!ts (not t:ibulared) as per JV 
r~gr~sians arc consistent with the analysis using 
OLS rl!g.r<:::ssions. 
' e VIRiusf~!:!!!:! 
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Table 5. R~lation b~W.t:(:n ESO and discretionary accruals 
The foHO\.vi1lg :ablf:: reports 1he t'cgtt;:Ssio1t results rc::~arding maoag~rial ownership and Jisc~tionary accruals. Different 
not.it ion::; t.:s~d in th~ table:: arc:: definc::d as iOflows: DACC = AbsoJut<: value or discn:tionary accruals: DACC ••'<' ""'Absolutt 
•alu~ o{i11~cme incrcasi11g (fiscmionllfy i!Cc'J"Ual~; DACC -rr "'Absoh1t< value of income decreasing discretionary accruals: 
ESO = Percent.age of ordinary shares cwuetl by the executive directors of the board: USUBSP =- Pet\'.:entage of ordinary 
sharc::s O\\.'m:d by ~hc:: tmaftiliac~ (c:.xdudtng Che dir.i:ctors) suO.sramial sharehoJdas; LEV = Leverage:, calculatc::d as the:: ratio 
of book value of debt to book value of totnl assets; BINO = Board independence calculated as the number of independent 
<lirector> scaled bv the siz:<: of the !wnnl: AUD=: MS= Market to book ratio: LTACC = Lagged total accruals; LOSS= 
LQSS dum.'lly vari;bfc : ASST "" Na:.t.iral log of book v~luc o( assets. T!it:: reported. rc:suhs a.re 11.c:teroskc::dastk:iry and 
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discretionary accruals. Our results suggest no 
qualitative diff~ren<.:es to the results reported 
~viously. 
Second, Himme!berg et al. (1999) argue that 
MSO may also be endogenously determined by the 
unQbservc:d ti.rm h~t'.!rogen~ity. Thcrtfore. we 
repeat all the an~lyses using a random effect modi;::! 
and foil to find any qualitative difference to our 
main findings. We then split our sample into four 
differont sub-samples based on time periods - from 
2000 to 2003, 2004 to 2006 as well as 2000 to 2002 
Fi1·st. w~ ltSc: th1: mode:! US'!d by Warfidd c:t al. 
( l 995) as an oltornative method to estimate the 
dis(;retionary accruals. According to this modd, 
discretionary accruals 3rll! equal to tht! Uifft:rence 
beMei::n tht: current p¢riod accl'ual and <:xpcctcd 
normal accrual and the expected normnl ai.::<.:rual is 
c:stimat;;d by using a fiv~ yc:ar firm spc:citic average 
of prior periods' accounting ~ccn..1~ls. We rerun all 
1hc r~gressions to examine the;: relations b~tv.'t::t!n the 
dift'Cr~( mM1ag:driat own<rship "~ri;,ibfos and 




·analysis. The purpos.i:: of spliuing th<: snmp!I! i.s to 
resr any impa1:t of !hC' m4ljor c:orporatt:: ri:gulator:.v 
changes (for <:xampk. the: lntrodut:tion of ASX 
corpotatc govc:rnancr:: guid!!linc-s fo 2003) that took 
plac~ during our stud)' pi:r~od. The:: results fo' thes~ 
sub-samples are qualitalivcly similar to the original 
results. 
Third. recognising that UH.:; l~vttls of 
independent director ownership may be too !ow to 
atfi:-ct th..:ir in<.'.t:tHivcs, we a1so examim; lht: impnct 
Of OWOCr.>hip by aU nor.~ex:ei.::utiVt: dlreCtO!'S that is, 
inde{Xn<li:::nt dtr«Cors an<l afftliati.."d {grey) dire~rors1 
on discn:tionary accruals. !S W.;: rct\in :lit the: 
reszr~.ssions tha1 we u~t:: for LSO. Ot.-r r~:,ul1s that 
ha~~ not b~~n tabulttted. suggt:st thnt thei·~ is no 
relation betwl!e!O discreticnatY accruals and 
ownc:rship by the non ... ex.ecutive directors. 
Fourth., we us~ an alternative approach tQ 
control for the industry 1.Hfft:rc:ncl!s. Consistc:nt wi(h 
thi: Austrafi~n <:conomy. a:,.ound 16% of our samp!~ 
are ro:source 1.:ompCl!tkS. Ac.:c.:ordingly. we also us~ a 
resource du.mm)' ln aU regressions and Coct:.ment a 
significantly positivi:: coetlicienr for this variable. It 
suggests that th(: resource companies are more. 
likely to man.age- earnings than th!! non .. resource 
compantc::s but our results relat:ng to th-e manag.¢riar 
own«>hip variablos (MSO. ESO and lSO) '"main 
unchanged. 
Fifth. as we find 3 significant codl1cil!nt for 
thl!' size (ASST) \':J.(iabi4i!, we cxamin~ the size 
cfft:cts on !he lit::vd of discrt:tionnry ac.:::.:ruals. We 
punition the s<Jmple lnto l<Jrgl! und small lirms 
based oa tht" median size of our ov~raH s.ampk 3.nd 
run aU reg.n:ssions on the sub-samples. Our r~sults 
for both large and sman firms show no 4ualitative 
differ<nces to the results reported previously. 
5. Conclusion 
Wr:. examin~ the reladuo !x!twet::n managerial share 
ownersl"'.ip and <.Jiscri:ti:onary acc.:ruals in Australia. 
Wt! posit that t::xecutiV'IC directors and indept:!nd~nt 
directors h~v..:: differt::nt iact;;?ntives '1nd also examine 
the ovm~rshirrdiscretionary accruals relation 
botwoen 6SO and ISO, separately. Our 
investigation shows a nonlin~r relation bt:twc~n 
MSO and the nb.solutc value:: of discretionary 
acc.:ruals. SpecificaHy. we ri.n.J a positive: ndalion 
betw~en MSO and discrt::tiom1ry ai:cru::i.ls up to a 
..:~rtain point fol!owt!d by a n~gative relation 
<inverse u .. sh.aped). Our analysi;:s rr:.vC"al a similar 
relation bt::We~n own.:rship and absolute valut: of 
<liscn:tionary accruals. for t!Xt't.'Utive <lir~;;tors as for 
managc:rial O\.VOership as a whok. H:owever. we:: 
find no signiticant relntion bt!'tWi:~n share 
ownership by indcpt::ndent dirl:!ctor& anr.1 
dfsc:c~ic;nary i:t:~crnals. 
Our finding " nonl'int:ar invi.::rse U~&hapt::d 
rdarion b~tw~n .\1$0 an<l di:scrc:Li<mcuv Dc1.·rua!s is 
in mark~<l t.."Ontr~st to prio1· r~~::irc:h. V<l.rlous 
Australian institutional fi:aturns including large but 
rdatively passive block holc.:krs and v~ry iow 
participation in shar~holder proxy \oOt~ suggest 
tha~ managiers do not m:ed a particularly largt: 
shareholding to derive private benefits of control. 
Consistent with the above, our empirical findings 
suggest that. in AustraHar a positive ownership-
discretioo.ary accrual relati.<:m dominates at lower 
levels of ownership. Aft<r a cortain !eve! of 
ownership (43.5% and 27.i% in respect of MSO 
and ESO, •~S.pt.!ctively}. We!: se~ a negativo:: ri:lation 
consistent with incentive alignment. 
Whilst che prior rc:s~nrch <::x2mining th~ 
O'l. .. ·nt:rshjp-Uiscr..:tionary ~ccruals relation focuses 
on MSO as a whok. we also con~ribu1t: to the 
literature by arguing that executive and indepenc!e~t 
directors havi,: dift~nt inc~ntiv::s that may impact 
the relation beiween ownership and dlscrc~iona.')' 
accruals. Our results su.pport such diff~ri:ntial 
in~~nlt\·es. and imp!)' th::it inde~nd.:::nt dift:\.':tors !r. 
Australia may be truly independent and are not 
influenced. by th~ u .. eori~J incentive alignmt:nl er 
entrenchment effol."ts asSQdat~d with share 
ownership. 
Notes 
[I J for e<amplc. Dignam (2005) found tr-'ll <ho 
proportion ot' su-.;cessfoi Aus:ralian tak\!O\.i;r biOs that 
were hostile di.:d1ig the pericd J 992·200 l was 7 :2%. He 
cootriis!.S th~s wiU1 the comparable: proponton of 
suci.:esstUt hostile bills in th~ US and th4! UK ~ing 2!% 
and 20"/o.. n=s!)l;!ctivc:f y. 
[2] The cv,dent:c on voting ittdk:cnes that. 86% • 88% of 
sh<ir~ arc: voti:d in tht:: US companies, around 50% tn. th~ 
UK but only 39o/o- 41% in Australia. 
[3] A siudy b~ Gui. Lynn and Tsui (2aDZ} e<amines th.: 
impact uf audit ~luality on. this rel&ioa using a sma!ler 
sa.mplc drawn from ~h.e period l992-3. 
{4] The ASX C-0rporotc Govem~:uic:e RecommendatiOll:5 
<lcem tha1 ~ diret10.r may be considered indepe!ldet:t e\'e:t 
if hi;: or sh~ tmlds up to 5% of the sha."l!S in that-compa.'ly. 
This is not dis.similar to the New Yor~ Stock Exchange 
roks which stat!! tl1at dirt:ccr.1r sha'"i;! ovm~:iship itself ls 
not a bar to an ind~pend!!oce finding. 
{S} Then.: is i=mpiticai support for thi:s proposition in the: 
related area of the managerial ownerShip.pet'formante 
relation. S:utlies ~on:roUing for c:ndogcnt:ity Uowm~mt 
d[!1Cren1 rt.."SultS from those that do not (see for exa.-nple. 
Oem:;etz an<! V i!lalonga, 200 !). 
[6) lt is <llso possibh~ lo argue: that entrenchmc:nt is not 
just a conS<:quenc.: o.f voting pov.-a. Som~ ma..1egers. by 
virtut' of tb~ir lent1~ with th.: firm. s~[US as a founder. 
may Ix cntrt:"rtc.:h<::<l with tclariwly srn2ll stakes. Os: the 
other hantl managers with higher ownt::rship sbkes in 
.finns with an active: outside block hold(:r or strong 
i~d(:pt::ndei1t tlirectt>tS may not be r:s et1trenched (Morck 
<t al. 198&). . 
{1] We specifically ident.ify non-exccufrve direecors who 
mcc:t the t.:dtt:rfa for indcep~nu~ncc as set out irt Eh~ 
tnv..:sttnc:nl and Fi.ru1nciol !:i.:rvh •. "CS Associo:.tion definitior. 
that was subsc:-que1uly adopted by tho:: ASX Corporate 




Corporn!e GOl'U11(1'1Cf a,1d Besr P1·actice 
Recommr:m1a11or.s. 
lSJ We. o.lso di) the sal':1t: analysi~ aJler trimming the tup 
and bot!om !% obs1:rvat1ons bas~d on tht:: k<::y variabl~s. 
chat is, MSO and DACC. Oor n:sulrs an~ not qualit.arivdy 
differecH from those reported in the paper. 
[9l An independem judge checked a random selection of 
the: uuT1i:rship and oorpotale gov~mam,;i:: c!a<a oSt!d in chis 
stud), 
{lO] .A common!) us~J niodcl to ~timate:: discretionnry 
a.ctrual :s tht: modifit:d Jorn::s modd (Otchmo,.• t!t al.. 
1995). 11~c timr: si:rii:s version of tht moJ1tit:d kines is 
tfata imt::nsivi:. Sim1!arly. :i prob1~m \ .. :id1 using the: 1.:fo~s 
sectional model is rh~t some ot" the industries classified 
untler the 1~0 digit ASX 1."0d~ do not h~ve ten 
observations (~im1S). Accordingly, using these mod.els 
would h-av.i;:. result'!.<.~ in a ctmsiderabk r~d1,.~<;1.i-on of <Jl.W 
sampie size. As funh.er ruialysis. w-0 also use the mc.>tfo1 ln 
\Varfidd. ct al. { 1995) to \?St;mat~ disi..:r-etior:a1-y accruals. 
[! t] Total accruals t,CA. - !!.CL - DEP 
where .UCA is the change in non-cash current assl!ts 
{changt: iri ~urro-\t assi::ts li:ss ch3.n.g~ m cash). D..CL is 
£h~ change: C11 (ummt li3biliti-r;:s <.:xClt.;di1lg shon: lc:nn d~bt 
(<:hang~ in cw-rc:nt liabili1i~ less the change: in debt 
includ..:d in curri::nt li:ibilitii::s ar.d minus th~ chang.~ in 
iricoine ta:-.: payabh::) and DEP is d~pteciation and 
amurtizativn ( Oechow c:t al , 1995). 
[121 \VO!. use the same equation to e.....amine Ihe ret<.1ions 
h..:tv .. t.!i:n ..:x1.?cutivt: .is wdl <1s i11d.:!pemkm dir~..::tors and 
d1si:1ctioriuy ~~r.:.rua!s replacing MSO oy ESO and tSO 
rt:specti\.'el;. 
[13] The numbc::t of ubservations for the in\'.cim~ 
incrt::U$ing. disl.iretioriary ~cruals and in;;omc:: Jc:cr~asing 
discn::rlonary ac~ruals arc 736 and 437 tespi:ctively. 
{ 14) Detoiled results are available on request. 
{ 15] The menn level sh;ire 0\\11er:s:hip by all non· 
¢x~cutiw directors in -our sample is 6.2% in contrast to 
6.3% owned by executive directors. 
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